As an extension of Mobile IPv6, the NEMO is needed to support session continuity for each mobile network node(MNN) across different access networks in aeronautical telecommunications network(ATN). However, the existing schemes of NEMO don't mention the authentication issues in handover procedure, which make it unsuitable for the ATN. In this paper, a handover authentication scheme based on security associations(HASA) is proposed for NEMO in ATN environment. HASA authenticates care-of address and prefix separately. The performance analysis shows that HASA not only mitigates the tunneling burden and decrease the handover lantency but also provides a higher level of security over NBSP and FMIPv6 .
Introduction
The Internation Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) adopted IPv6 for use within its future IP-based ATN [1] . The communications in heterogeneous ATN environment includes the packets signialing between cockpit in the airplane and the air traffic controller in the ground, which are time-critical and security-sensitive [2] . The NEMO basic protocol(NBSP) is provided by Internet Engineering Task Force(IETF) to support the session continuity of a whole mobile network when changing the access point of Internet [3] . As an extension of Mobile IPv6, NEMO inherits the disadvantage that all packets have to be routed through the home agent(HA). This causes large latency between the communication peers, especially when the HA is far away from the local area in ATN. In addition, NEMO does not specify how authentication, authorization and accounting(AAA) should be handled in mobile networks, especially for handover procedure. Petrescu [4] described various attacks against NEMO, like traffic hijacking and man in the middle attack. Therefore the confidentiality of the identity and the integrity of the transmission packets are highly desired.
In this paper, we introduce NEMO framework into aeronautical communications and propose a handover authentication scheme based on security associations(HASA) for NEMO in ATN environment. HASA can achieve mutual authentication between MR and its access router(AR) to improve the identity confidentiality. The signaling and transmission packets are protected by the authentication during the handover procedure. In addition, we mitigate the tunneling burden in FMIPv6 [5] and eliminate the suboptimal routing problem in NEMO protocol that all packets between the MNN and correspondent node(CN) are routed through the HA.We simulate the proposed scheme to evaluate the handover delay compared with other schemes. Moreover, we analysis the security resilience and prove HASA can prevent various active and passive attacks .
Related work NEMO protocol. NEMO provides a mobile network prefix(MNP) for the MR which is never changed in the communications and also a correspondent node prefix(CNP) for the correspondent node. The MNNs that attach to the MR inside the mobile network obtain their addresss from the MNP advertised by the MR. When the aircraft performs handover across different network, the MR moves to a foreign network and attach to an access router. A care-of address(CoA) is assigned to the MR. Then, Binding Update(BU)/Binding Acknowledge(BA) procedure is performed between the MR and HA to inform the fresh location of the MR. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of NEMO in ATN. As NEMO doesn't specify how AAA should be handled in mobile network, fewer studies consider the AAA authentication in NEMO environment. H.Fathi [6] presentes a leakage resilient-authenticated key establishment(LR-AKE) scheme to supply authenticate between the MR and LFNs, the MR and its HA, and VMNs and HA or CNs. However, in ATN, HA is always far away from the foreign network, which could enlarge the transmission delay. Lim [7] proposes an authentication scheme that could reduce the authentication time while the computation overhead is high which make it unsuitable in ATN. Chuang [8] integrates LMAM and E-HMIPv6 to decrease the handoff latency, but the existing tunneling burden can increase the packet loss during handover.
The proposed HASA scheme
In this section, we will describe the proposed scheme HASA in detail. The operations of HASA include two parts: macro authentication and micro authentication.When the MR first moves into a new foreign network, HASA performs the macro authentication procedure. It executes the micro authentication if the MR moves within the same foreign domain.
The NEMO based ATN will carry ATS and AOC data. ATN is a closed network, not reachable from the public Internet because of the security-sensitive [9] .when performing prefix authentication in HASA, publick-key cryptography with an associated catenary public key infrastructure(PKI) and certificates are used. Fig. 2 shows the single-root based certificate authority(CA) scheme. The sub-CA is signed by neighbor CAs as the flight line of the airplane is fixed. For performing the CoA authentication, a Care-of Test Init/Care-of Test(CoTI/CoT) is chosen to provide the MR with a symmetric key during the handover procedure [10] . Macro authentication. Macro is initiated when a layer-2 trigger occurs. After the RtSolPr and PrRtAdv, MR creates a CoA and sends a fast BU(FBU) message to PAR, which contains SAMR, the security association of MR, CERTMR, MR's certificate and NMR, a randomly generated nonce. The FBU is signed by the private key of the MR. Fig. 3 shows the macro authentication signaling. Then, PAR sends a handover initiate(HI) to NAR. After that, NAR and LAAA exchanges the CoTI/CoT to authenticate the CoA of the MR. LAAA generates the symmetric care-of test key MR k in the following way:
And As the MNP is fixed during the handover, the MNP authentication in Micro is not the same as that in Macro. The symmertic home key SH k now is used as a session to generate key S k as follows :
The new key S k is used to calculate the signature message SM2 in ALAAA attached to BU. And the BU message doesn't contain any certificate or signature because the MNP has been authorized in Macro. If LAAA could verify the SM2, the new CoA of the MR is proved to be legal and a BA message will be sent back to MR. The prefix authentication procedure is done.
Simulation and analysis
Security analysis of HASA. Before the analysis, we suppose the key length is robust for the system and the one-way hash function is irreversible which means that it is easy to figure H(x) when the value of x is given, while given the value of H(x), computing x is very difficult [8] . We compare the security feature of HASA with LR-AKE scheme, SeNERO scheme in Table 1 .
(1) Mutual authentication: In HASA, the MR authenticates its prefix to LAAA, the LAAA also proves to be the legal owner by verifing signature message in BA. This avoids an adversary to masquerade as a legitimate LAAA and hijack the prefix and packets will not be redirected to the illegal prefix.
(2) Tunneling burden: In MIPv6, a tunnel is established between NAR and PAR during handover and the packets destined to MR will be stored in or via the tunnel. It will cause the tunneling burden and packet loss because of the limited space of the tunnel. In HASA, after the CoTI/CoT, the packets from NAR to MR could be first forwarded to LAAA and then delivered to MR according to the CoA, which will mitigate the tunneling burden.
(3) Local authentication: In ATN communication, if the aircraft is far away from the home network, starting in China and ending in Europe, the large geographical distance will lead to unreachable of the HA. HASA performs local authentication without the participation of the HA. The authentication procedure in foreign domain doesn't need to exchange signaling with HA.
(4) Modified attack resistance: The one-way hash function in HASA to generate different keys make sure that information can not be modified. The RPI in the procedure could also record the ID or timestamp of the authentication. Therefore, a malicious modified packet will be easily identified by verifing the hash values.
(5) Replay attack resistance: The random number has a fresh lifetime in macro and micro authentication. It is difficult for hijacker to get the accurate the value. Therefore, the proposed scheme has a nice performace when it comes to replay attack resistance because of the random number. Table 1 Comparasion of security feature
Handover delay of HASA. We define the handover delay as the time interval between the moment that the layer-2 trigger is initiated and the moment that MR receive the first BA message in foreign network. Table 2 shows the parameter values used in analysis based on [8] . The authentication delaies of NEMO, LR-AKE and HASA are calculated as follows : Table 2 System parameters used for analysis Fig. 5 shows the simiulation result of authentication for different distances between the home domain and local domain. The authentication delay of HASA keeps the same and is lower than NEMO and LR-AKE. However, NEMO and LR-AKE increases sharply when the distance from home to local is getting farther. In Micro, the prefix doesn't need to be authenticated again because it has been done in Macro, which makes HASA achieves a better result.
Summary
In this paper, an authentication scheme HASA is presented for NEMO in ATN, that authenticates the identity of the MR based on security associations during handover procedure to improve the confidentiality and integrity in ATN. The CoA and MNP are authenticated separately. In addition, HASA can eliminate the tunneling burden of FMIPv6 which reduce packets loss and authentication delay. The analysis and simulation result show that the handover performance of the proposed authentication scheme can significantly outperforms those of NBSP and LR-AKE in mobile network.
